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IINTRODUCTION
The broad objective of this Livestigation is to ascertain the effects
of early feasibility and design studies on the eventual outcome of R&D
projects. This subject has assumed particular importance with the intro-
duction by the Department of Defense of the "phased procurement" approach
to the acquisition of major weapons systems. NASA has adopted a similar
procurement procedure for space systems of significant proportions.
Although these recent actions have emphasized the importance of the
feasibility and design study by formalizing and structuring the early phases
of weapons or space system planning, advanced studies have for many years
had important influence in shaping the direction of R&D efforts. Studies
of technical and economic feasibility, whether they have been conducted as
a company "marketing" activity or as a part of Government agency planning,
have been pursued in response to the rising costs of R&D. '.These costs have
made it necessary, prior to commitment of significant procurement funds, to
evaluate carefully alternate approaches to project implementation in terms
of technical feasibility, cost effectiveness, reliability, and timeliness.
These elements of evaluation define the scope of what is termed an ad-
vaned study in this investigation. It is different than "advanced develop-
ment" of a particular instrument, sensor, or subsystem, but such develop-
ments may be a by-product of advanced studies. It is not preliminary de-
sign, which is restricted to the functional design of a system, but the ad-
vanced study must consider the effects of potential design problems and tech-
nical risks in project conduct. It is more than just a cost study, although
it must cover cost as a measure of the economic feasibility of the technical
options considered.
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Since advanced studies are potentially so broad in scope, the approach
to their initiation becomes an important decision for company and Government
agency management. To understand the conditions and environment under which
these early study activities are undertaken, studies were made of two major
aerospace companies and a NASA space research and development center. The
emphasis was put on activities which precede formal procurement actions by
the Government agency.
Examination of the information derived from these sources has resulted
in the conclusion that important competitive factors operate prior to the
formal initiation of the procurement process which not only affect the
project planning and initiation, but also heavily influence the eventual
selection of a specific contractor. This early activity, involving both
potential contractors and sponsoring Government agencies, is felt to be
sufficiently pervasive in the procurement process that it is given the status
in this report of a distinct phase of the procurement cycle - the pre-soli-
citation phase.
II
SPONSORING AGENCY - CONTRACTOR ROLES IN THE PRE- SOLICITATION PHASE
In the pre-solicitation phase of major R&D procurements critical de-
cisions are made by the sponsoring agency in regard to the portion of a
project to be done within the sponsoring agency and that which a contractor
will undertake, the degree of system integration effort that the contractor
will be required to undertake, the utilization of designs which may be de-
pendent on existing capabilities which some, but not all, contractors pos-
sess, the requirements for liaison effort which may dictate the close geo-
graphical presence of a contractor to the sponsoring agency, the choice of
ground-based testing programs requiring large-scale facilities, and the type
of management information, project control, or configuration control systems
to be used. All of these choices and decisions mqy, in some degree, favor
some contractors over others. The foresight of potential contractors in
re-orienting their company research, capital expenditures, and marketing
efforts to anticipate the results of these early decisions increases the
probability of receiving a contract award. These anticipatory measures on
the part of potential contractors emphasize the use of company-sponsored
research and studies, the results of which are fed to sponsoring agencies
in order to elicit reaction or comment. Company intelligence estimates
attempt to predict the progress and timing of project decisions so as to
bring together at the appropriate time results of company-initiated advanced
studies and the sponsoring agency need for information for decision. The
objectives of this act`.vity are to shape early programmatic decisions and
to be in a position to be totally responsive to the eventual Request for
Proposal (RFP). Thus, in the pre-solicitation phase of a major procurement,
there is a dynamic interaction of sponsoring agency planning and programmatic
decision-making and company initiated and sponsored advanced studies whose
purposes are to influence project decisions, anticipate an eventual RFP,
and to build up a relationship with individuals in agency project planning
and management positions.
Some aspects of this interchanSe are beneficial for the sponsoring
agency, as it helps to keep agency personnel aware of the state-of-the-art
and provides a wider range of considerations in planning and decision func-
tions. It is certainly beneficial to the companies involved, since it means
ultimate competitive advantage insofar as their efforts are utilized in
project planning and RFP preparation. The detrimental effect of this inter-
change is the introduction of a number of biased inputs into formulation of
project plans and initiation of proposed procurements. This is particularly
disadvantageous when it is recognized that the decision environment that
exists in the pre-solicitation phase is characterized by high uncertainty
regarding performance objectives and diffuse responsibility for decision
making.
III
THE DECISION ENVIRONMENT IN THE PRE-SOLICITATION PHASE
In the space system acquisition process, which is primarily research
and development oriented, there has been increasing recognition that a
better understanding must exist on the levels of risk describing a project
or system before its initiation. This risk factor may be better appreciated
through development of a set of alternatives which reflect pertain combina-
tions of performance, reliability, time, and cost, which themselves carry an
element of uncertainty. The choice of configuration of the project or system
may be made by evaluating the sets or combinations of factors in the context
of a low or minimum risk level. The problem of choice becomes complicated
when certain factors are fixed in some degree, (e.g., funds limitations or
budget ceilings, fixed astronomical dates for planetary exploration systems),
while other factors, such as achievable performance, have varying degrees of
uncertainty and, therefore, potentially frustrate the attainment of some
acceptable risk level. The choice of a system, then, and the means of ac-
quiring that system become primarily economic ,judgements requiring consider-
ation and optimization of a number of constraints and variables, which con-
tain the element of uncertainty. The choice takes on a further economic
dimension in that it also becomes important to ascertain at what point in
time decisions or choices should be made. A projection of information avail-
ability or the effect of "learning curves" vs. uncertainty must accompany the
evaluation of sets of variables if optimum choices are to be approximated.
This complex decision environment accompanie._ the project or system acquisi-
tion throughout its lifetime. Or. the one hand, the paradoxical situation
exists where decisions that most seriously affect the course of the effort
VT
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are made in the pre-solicitation phase, when uncertainty is highest. On the
other, as the element of uncertainty is reduced with time, other variables
become more fixed and constraining, resulting in reduced flexibility in
making major alterations.
A further element which complicates the decision process in the pre-
solicitation phase is the multiplicity of organizational elements and persons
who are in a position to influence various aspects of the project design
which, indirectly, affects the choice of ultimate contractors. As an example,
for NASA projects there are the Field Centers which initiate project proposals
and are delegated responsibility to manage system and subsystem contracts.1
Within NASA Headquarters there are many individuals who participate in
project planninf; decisions, and there is a high
,/
degree of influence from the
scientific community as to project. ob^jectives.`i
Thus, decision-making in the pre-solicitation phase involves choices
between project alternates which are characterized by some level of
and a high degree of uncertainty; these choices are affected by cce'ain con
straints and influenced by many organizational entities. It must be recog-
nized that here is a climate in which companies have the best chance for
competitive advantage, that is, before the issue of Requests for Proposal,
when they must compete on an equal basis through the formal proposal and
contract award process. The next sections of the report will discuss in
some detail the impact of the pre-solicitation phase on project initiation
and contractor selection
J NASA Management Instruction 4-1-1.
?J NASA Management Instruction 37-1-1.
IV
THE PRE-SOLICITATION PHASE AND PROJECT INITIATION
Project initiation consists of successive approximations, each ir,
greater depth and deter{.1 0 of a mission and/or project configuration which
will satisfy a specific objective within the broad objectives of, for
example, the national space program. Utilizing data derived from interviews
conducted at two aerospace companies and a NASA Center, a model sequence has
been developed which includes essential events in the advanced study and
project initiation process.
The sequence starts with planning studies whose purposes are to examine
possible future projects and missions and their inter-relationship, to iden-
tify the degree of reliance on technology derived from present and past
projects, and to forecast the state of technology as a function of time.
The second step is to investigate the various general concepts for, and
characteristics of, systems which could accomplish the projects and missions
identified in the planning study phase. From these general system concepts
and characteristics various alternate system designs capable of meeting
mission objectives may be studied, or a single system design may be developed
to gain understanding of its capabilities. At this point specific technolouj
and state-of-the-art advances necessary in the accomplishment of stated ob-
jectives should be isolated. This analysis should be developed in economic
as well as technical terms and should be extended to include schedules,
costs, and reliability requirements. The next step in the sequential plan-
ning process is the investigation of specific designs required to meet fairly
definite sets of mission objectives. The goal of these studies is to
establish feasibility and to examine the trade-offs between probability of
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mission success and extent of mission capability. At this point, an approxi-
mation of the level of risk should be available to determine if the specific
designs considered should be pursued further. If so, the preliminary design
phase begins to establish the precise system configuration, subsystem require-
ments, specifications, and interfaces. This sequential procedure should be
punctuated by deliberations on study results and design reviews, followed by
decisions on the direction in which further design activity should prozeed.
At the end of this process a firm basis pry-sumably exists upon which to pro-
ceed with formal solicitations for system and subsystem contracted efforts.
In practice, this idealized planning activity is affected by press,ires
to compress the sequential aspects and bypass some of the considc-rations of
alternate systems and concepts. For example, long hardware lea-' time-,
dictate that design choicea be made earlier. Potential contractors attempt
to second-guess specific mission objectives and required capabilities by
engaging in company sponsored design and planning studies of their own. The
results of these studies are made known to the sponsoring agency or Field
Center through presentations or unealicitated proposals and thus indirectly
may provide an input into the planning process, creating the possibility of
some advantage for particular contract :rs. However, the chance for• com-
pct;itive advantage is considerably diminished by the number of firms who
engage in this kind of activity and utilize similar "marketing" techniques,
thus partially neutralizing the efforts of any one company.
In order to understand better the particulars of company marketing
strategy during the pre-solicitation phase a structured interview was
designed, consisting of a number of interrelated questions bearing on company-
initiated actions in anticipation of a procurement solicitation. This lie'.
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of questions appears as Appendix A.
Using this interview format, extended conferences were held with
management, marketing, and engineering personnel of two aerospace fircis
which have conducted space system developments of sizeable magnitude. In
responding to the interview questions both firms generally displayed similar
attitudes and approaches to the activities conducted during the pre-solici-
tation phase. One significant feature that emerged from the interview
question concerning the choice of company funded projects was the treatment
of this decision in a capital investment context. Company funded research
projects were considered in the same manner as additional facilities and
equipment. Indeed, the need for special purpose facilities was evaluated
as a supporting item to research efforts. The diminishing number of major
weapons and space systems initiated, the concomitant intensity of competition,
and the fewer number of funded "hunting license" research contracts contributed
to an awareness that anticipatory research and development .activities must
be viewed in the capital investment sense. It was stated that company funds
have to be spent much in ac;-,;!-ice of expected pay-off and must be justified
on the basis of efficient utilization of, and maximum return on, capital
expenditures. This awareness was manifested in the criteria for selection
of the company funded (or Independent Research and Development) efforts.
Generally, these criteria were as follows (no priority implied by the order):
1. Contributions to long range sales and income objectives.
2. Company capability to undertake research efforts in terms of
existing skills and experience.
3. Perceived competitor activity in the same technical area.
4. The opportunity for "fall-out" to other projects or commercial
products.
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5. The probability that the project(s) to which company-sponsored
work is applicable will be approved.
6. Technical feasibility and relationship to the state of technology.
The above c riteria were weighted and formed a value system used by
company management to decide which projects were to be undertaken and the
level of effort to be applied to each. Two salient points to be noted in
the above list are the perception of the activities of the competition and
the role of risk, both in terms of technical feasibility and project initi-
ation. As regards the competition, forecasts were made of the progress of
competing firms in solving technical problems through company-funded efforts.
Competitor breakthroughs were quickly factored into the evaluation scheme,
and research tasks dropped if they had been pre-empted by competitors'
activities. The value of new data to potential customers was constantly
measured against cost, and the "stock" of a research project was determined,
not by its intrinsic value, but by its relative value to a customer who is
also being exposed to the research and study results of the competition.
The second point to be made in conjunction with the above enumerated
list of criteria is the role of risk. The last two criteria on the list
are expressions of economic risk. The first of these is the risk that the
project will not be approved, thereby reducing the possibility of near-term
payoff for the sponsored activity. The second is an expression of technical
risk, or feasibility, given the present and forecasted state of technology.
The interesting feature of these criteria is their interaction. A high
technical risk al , ^ increases the probability that the project will not be
approved, whereas a low technical risk nay mean that the particular technical
problem proposed for company sponsorship is already on the brink of being
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solved. Thus, to the proposer a dilemma exists; he cannot propose a re-
search project which has either too high or too low a technical risk, for
either way it may not be approved. Likewise, the company would not be
motivated to apprise a potential customer of the high risk estimated for
successful solution of a particular problem, since this would increase the
risk of project cancellation. This suggests that a customer should be in
a position to study independently risk factors in future projects.
The aspect of uncertainty also entered into the risk calculations of
companies. Sometimes a researzh project was approved, just to narrow the
uncertainty and to determine what the risk really was.
A prime technique that was mentioned by the two companies interviewed
as effective in apprising the potential customer of these company efforts
was to utilize unsolicited proposals early in the planning process in order
to offer specific company experience and results of company-sponsored
studies and development. In terms of economic payoff the interviews indi-
cated that unsolicited proposals result in a higher percentage of awards
than that achieved through the formal RFP system. A further objective of
unsolicited proposals, more subtle, was to give to the sponsoring agency or
Center the image of a responsive and aggressive contractor who is able to
undertalke a complex project by virtue of the quality of the plannint and
analysis effort that the particular company has achieved under its own Pinds.
Summaries of the specific responses to questions asked in the aforen:cn-
tioned interviews are given in Appendix B.
VTHE PRE-SOLICITATION PHASE AND THE
CONTRACTOR SELECTION PROCESS
The discussion so far has attempted to emphasize the importance of
the pre-solicitation phase as to its impact on early project decisions and
project planning. It is the purpose of this section to explore the question
of the effects of the pre-solicitation phase on the specific choice of con-
tractors.
Some recent research at Massachusetts Institute of Technology has
yielded results which show a certain connection between contract awards
and the preferences of the technical initiator for certain companies.)
In studies carried out over a two-year period on Department of Defense R&D
contract awards, contractors preferred by technical initialors, as indicated
by the company order on Purchase Requisitions, won eventual contracts in
60 percent of the cases studied. Ten percent of the contract awards went
to contractors not listed by technical initiators but added from small
business lists or procurement source lists. The balance of the awards went
to sources on alphabetized lists or sources so indicated by the technical
initiator that it was not possible to determine his preferences. The sur-
veys encompassed eighty-eight contract awards with amounts ranging from
$100,000 to $8,000,000.
Another study, also carried out at MIT, involving smaller contracts=
indicates that the contractors ranked technically highest in twenty-two
"How the U.S. Buys Research", article in International Science and
Engineering magazine, E. B. Roberts.
1 "Factors Inl'.uencing Technical Quality of R&D Proposals", Working Paper
No. 68-65, MiT, T. S. Allen and D. G. Marquis.
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proposal solicitations expended only an average amount of proposal effort,
whereas the next highest ranked companies expended considerably higher
effort during the proposal preparation period.
A third study relating to pre-proposal activity shows the increasin
use by companies of unsolicitated proposals . This has already been
mentioned as a technique for presenting results of company sponsored
efforts to prospective sponsoring agencies. The MIT results from this
study were reinforced in one of the interviews conducted as a part of this
investigation, wherein the company indicated that its acceptance rate of
unsolicitated proposals was 30 percent, a figure higher than the percentage
of contract awards vs. the number of formal company bids.
One conclusion that could be derived from these research study results
is that some sort of preferential treatment is accorded some companies by
elements within sponsoring agencies. Indeed, regulations in DOD and NASA
aimed at reducing improper involvement prior to contract award have been
initiated over the past two years. NASA has issued a Source Evaluation
Board Manual designed to outline procedures and policies which ensure im-
partiality and objectivity in contractor selection of large contract
awards) . DOD has been further evolving arrangements to increase imparti-
ality in source selection procedures) . Another measure whose objective is
to reduce the possibility of improper involvement is the anti-gratuity regu-
lations employed by DOD and perhaps to be followed by NASA. All of these
1J "Comparative Analysis of R&D Marketing Strategy", L. B. Berger,
Masters Thesis, MIT.
J NPC 402, NASA Source Evaluation Board Manual.
?l "Source Selection in DOD", Aviation Week, October 5, 1964.
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measures are aimed at increasing the competitive aspects of contract
awards by minimizing the chance of competitive advantages being obtained
by any one contractor over another. However, the emphasis is on actions
of contractors and sponsoring agencies during the formal proposal solici-
tation period.
It is the contention of this report that implications of improper
involvement are not supported by the research studies mentioned and,
further, that the preferences of technical initiators and decision makers
for certain companies are due, not only to satisfactory past experience,
but also because of activities of these companies in the pre-solicitation
phase of the procurement. As previously discussed, these early activities
consist of presentation of company research and study results, unsolicited
proposals, contracts for supporting services, and other measures aimed at
conveying the image of a responsive, energetic company that understands
the technical problems and complexities of the proposed procurement, and
one who has done its homework in anticipating the requirements of the
project. To the extent that a particular company has been successful in
creating this impression there is a natural predisposition toward this
potential contractor. This is particularly true in very advanced research
and development projects, where project success depends on close cooperation
between the contractor and sponsoring agency or Center. In these cases
anticipated contractor responsiveness is weighted heavily durinc the evalu-
ation process.
While the restrictions on gratuities and improper individual involve-
ment, along with the new procedures on source selection and evaluation by
both DOD and NASA, are necessary for a well-ordered procurement system, it
-15-
should be recognized that possibilities for real competitive advantage
exist completely outside the scope of many of these regulations. The
results of the studies mentioned, which are among the few that bear on
this subject, seem to underscore the importance to contractor selection
of activities in the pre-solicitation phase. The study result pertaining
to effort expended during the proposal preparation is particularly illu-
minating, since it indicates that proposal effort is correlated with
higher or lower technical rankings, except for the first-ranked company.
The sample was a significant one, the correlations clean, and the expla-
nation of the highest ranked firm only expending average proposal effort
would seem to substantiate the contention that the selection was influ-
enced by the pre-proposal effort of the first-ranked company. This con-
elusion is further reinforced by another result of the same study, namely,
that the strongest element influencing technical ranking is the size of
the technical staff of the company. The first ranked company, possessing
a depth of manpower resources, apparently employed this stc,,ff strength,
prior to formal proposal efforts, in a manner which anticipated the re-
quirements of the formal solicitation. Companies not employing a large
technical staff would experience difficulty in mounting a broad-based
technical activity prior to the Request for Proposal.
VI
SLWARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The discussion to this point has focused attention on the decision
environment that exists during the pre-solicitation phase of R&D contract-
ing, an atmosphere which creates possibilities of competitive advantage
through company funded efforts aimed at influencing programmatic decisions,
creating an image of responsiveness, and anticipating the requirements of
the eventual Request for Proposal. This report has also attempted to re-
late the effects of this contractor activity during the pre-solicitation
phase to contractor selection. Results of other research indicate a
connection between technical initiator preferences and contract awards.
These preferences are shaped by experience with the potential contractors,
no doubt, but interviews with two electronics-based firms who are heavily
engaged in R&D contracting revealed a methodical, aggressive policy toward
shaping the preferences of sponsoring agencies. Furthermore, contract
awards went to those companies who expended an average amount of effort
during the formal proposal phase, and it is suggested that this result re-
veals considerable pre-solicitation activity in the part of the successful
proposers.
If the contention is accepted that the most significant possibilities
for competitive advantage exist during the pre-solicitation phase, then
the appropriateness of measures designed to reduce the extent of potential
advantages should be evaluated. The consequences of these measures may
not be in the best interests of the Government. For example, there are
efforts to regulate the contacts between agency and company personnel prior
to the formal solicitation phase. Policies are presently in existence whose
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objectives are to enjoin sponsoring agency personnel from discussing any
aspect of pending solicitation effort unless such information is coinci-
dentally made available to all potential contractors. Strict application
of this policy to fairly immediate procurement actions is necessary. How-
ever, overzealous attempts to regulate and restrict communications with
potential contractors can have detrimental effects, since planning for
higily complex projects demands the widest possible range of considerations
and {nvestigation of factors which may contribute to project success. Also,
contractors afford an important method of cross-fertilization of experience
between sponsoring agencies and between projects. It would seem more
prudent not to unduly restrict information exchange between potential con-
tractors and sponsoring agency personnel; indeed, the wide-spread sharing
of technical information is necessary to a climate of competition and is
advantageous in the long run to technological advancement.
Also, one cannot restrict the right of companies to invest their own
money in anticipatory studies regardless of the competitive advantage that
this seems to present, since this is simply exercising traditional company
prerogatives of indulging in present investment to create future production.
In this regard, company investment in research is a capital decision much
the same as the buying of machine tools or other capital equipment.
Another measure which has been considered is the structuring of the
pre-solicitation phase to insure maximum competition during the solicitation
phase of a procurement. The Department of Defense has codified the early
phases of project initiation in very large weapon systems acquisitions
through the use of the Program Definition Phase, and NASA has adopted a
phased procurement approach for large contracts. During early phases of a
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weapon or space system acquisitions parallel design study contracts are
let, themselves a costly item. The emphasis is on consideration of various
program alternatives to assess feasibility, risk levels, and cost effec-
tiveness. Insofar as this forces measured deliberation on program objec-
tives and design options, this development is necessary to construct a
sound foundation for major weapons and space system acquisitions. The
question may still be raisad as to the effectiveness of the phased procure-
ment approach in maximizing competition. There is evidence that this
approach simply pushes the informal competition back prior to the defini-
tion phases and, therefore, does not materially change the competitive
situation. An example of this circumstance is seen in the published
practice of one large aerospace company of scheduling specific company
funded advanced studies and unsolicited proposals as distinct milestones
prior to the anticipated RPT date for the Program 'Definition Phase studies.
Since the perception of what the competition is doing is so important to
the inttiation of advanced studies, it is not unreasonable to assume that
the practice of this particular aerospace company is widespread.
The actions of the two companies examined in this study provide an
important insight, namely, that competition does exist in an intense, but
unregulated, form during the pre-solicitation phase. On the other hand,
the possibilities for competitive advantage also are greater prior -,.o
formal initiation of the procurement by a Request for Proposal. To repeat
an earlier proposition, overly restrictive measures to regulate this phase
of the procurement process could be disadvantageous; for example, restric-
tion of contractor-agency contacts and communications could reduce the wide
range of considerations important in planning complex projects. It is
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suggested that a better mode of operation during the pre-solicitation phase
is for sponsoring agencies to concentrate on developing appropriate methods
for planning, mission analysis, risk assessment, and cost-effectiveness.
This implies that sponsoring agencies must organize an in-house capability
for mission analysis and techno-economic studies and not rely on industry
for inputs in these areas. However, the competitive energy of industry
in the pre-solicitation phase can be put to use in advanced work on
challenging technological problems, the solution of which would advance
the state of technology and reduce uncertainty regarding technical feasi-
bility. In effect, this suggestion seeks to clarify an appropriate and
useful role for both potential contractors and sponsoring agencies during
the pre-solicitation phase, rather than to regulate the actions of either
or to restrict contacts between the two groups.
The scope of this investigation to date does not permit further specific
recommendations. This report has, however, attempted to emphasize the im-
portance of analyzing and further understanding the complicated inter-
action of companies and the government during the pre-solicitation phase.
This understanding i g necessary in pursuing the over-all objective stated
in the Introduction, namely, to ascertain the effects of these early acti-
vities on the eventual outcome of R&D projects. A delineation of such
effects could produce more effective and efficient approaches to initiation
of R&D projects.
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APPENDIX A
Interview Questions
1. Now does your company decide what corporate projects will be under-
-	 taken (incl. Independent Research Programs)?
2. Explain the process of selection.
3. At what point do results of corporate activity become unsolicited
proposals? How is the approach of the unsolicited proposal deter-
mined?
4. Given an objective or a mission (via a funded study contract or
feasibility study), how does your company proceed to organize its
efforts; what consideration is given to time, cost, performance
tradeoffs?
5. How does your company decide the level of effort to apply to
efforts (funded or not) Which show the promise of future contracts?
6. Does your company attempt to quantify values that accrue to the com-
pany from alternate approaches? Does it attempt to generate a value
system for a particular effort?
7. How does your company assess its own capabilities and capacity for
undertaking a job?
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APPMWIX B
Company A - A Division of a large, well-diversified electrical/
electronic company which has been involved in major space
and weapons systems developments for both DOD and NASA.
1. How does your company decide what corporate projects will be under-
&
2. taken, including Independent Research Programs? Explain the pro-
cess of selection.
Market forecasts are formulated in terms of "products" (manned space
vehicles, lunar & planetary vehicles, etc.). Ten-year estimates are made
of funds available from Government agencies for such efforts, and each
"product" is assigned to an organizational element. For example, emerging
products (such as nuclear propulsion) are assigned to an advanced systems
engineering department, while satellite applications are assigned to a
spacecraft development department. Specific proposals for projects to be
undertaken as a part of the IRLD program are made by the various depart-
ments according to the relationship to product line, impact on future
business, technical risk, and availability of resources. These proposals,
in turn, are reviewed f-)r allowability of costs and "business balance" by
business management and for technological balance and requirements for
specialized research skills by the technical director. The final review
and approval is made by the general management of the :cmpany. The measure
of technological balance is made by relating critical problems and/or
technologies to potential "products" or projects. Those IRO projects are
selected and approved which treat the solution of critical technological
problems ranging across the largest number of products. The definition of
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a critical problem area is principally an unsolved technology problem,
the solution of which would increase the chance o: "getting the business".
Technical risk tends to be measured in two ways: in terms of anti-
cipated performance margins vs. the state of technology and the applica-
bility to ultimate business (the risk that the product or project will
not be approved). Uncertainty sometimes prompts the decision to fund a
high risk effort, just to determine what the risk really is. A low risk
technological effort is one on which previous work has been done.
3. At what point do results of corporate activity become unsolicited
proposals? How is the approach of the unsolicited proposal deter-
mined?
There is no net time for generation of unsolicited proposals; t'..-ning
is determined by being sensitive to customer needs for information. Gen-
erally, unsolicited proposals are distilled from on-going company-funded
research projects, are tied to long range requirements, lead formal RFP's
by 8 to 12 months, and have a nigher pay-off than response to RFP's (un-
solicited proposals result in contracts 30% of the time).
4. How does your company organize its funded study efforts; what con-
sideration is given to time, cost, performance tradeoffs?
Prior to receipt of funded study contracts, a small study team is
assembled (perhaps as much as six months prior), placed in one physical
area and answering to a Y •oject, or study, manager. Work is begun to
schedule the anticipated study requirements, to define the expected prob-
lem areas, to initiate parallel technology tasks in critical areas, to
establish the "market picture" and potential budget and funding availabil-
ity. Also, customer contacts are extensively carried out; heavy emphasis
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is given in this period to informal presentations.
When a study contract is awarded, the study team is already organized
and experienced, there is an established relationship between company
sponsored efforts and the agency-funded contract.
5. How does your company decide the level of effort to apply to efforts
6. (government funded or not) which show promise of future contracts?
Do you attempt to generate a value system for a particular effort?
Primarily a risk calculation. An assessment is made of the various
opportunities that exist at regular points in time for future contracts.
This assessment consists of a weighted evaluation of the factors of
credibility (will the project be approved for execution through the acqui-
sition phase), competitive chance (what is the competition doing), hard-
ware timing (long-range or short-range prospect), estimated first hardware
contract value, and degree of obligation to the customer. The application
of this weighted evaluation represents a value system that the management
can use Llo approve company funded projects or to make a bid-no bid decision
on government funded study efforts. The application of this value system
is conducted within the context of the company objectives concerning
product line balance and specific goals as to sales and income, cost re-
duction targets, and control of overhead rates.
7. How does your company assess its own capabilities and capacity for
undertaking a job?
The assessment of capability is conducted in four areas; technical
competence, facilities and equipment, manpower availability, and corporate
funding available. Panels are established in various technologies to
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present management with reports on the state of technolo&r in that area,
the existing company capability, present activities, key events, critical
problems, manpower availability. An important item in this assessment is
the adequacy of capability vs. the competition both for the present and
future.
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Company B - A Division of a large, well-diversified electrical/
electronic company, which has been involved in major space
and ground communications developments for both DOD and
NASA-
1. How does your company decide what corporate projects will be under-
&
2. taken, including Independent Research Programs? Explain the process
of selection.
Formal independent research planning documents are generated by
engineering groups in the fall of each year, reviewed by division and
corporate management during the last quarter of the year, and initiated
in January. The projects usually sponsored have as their objective the
solution of system and subsystem problems. No "product" is expected to
accrue, but rather the company tech;iological base is increased. The cri-
teria which affects the selection of company funded or IR&D programs are
current and anticipated governmental need, feasibility, state-of-the-art,
competence in the field, facilities, cost, manpower availability, and
value of data to be obtained. Continuing reviews of existing efforts are
based on data value vs. cost. Programs may be re-oriented due to the
advent of new techniques or breakthroughs (both company and competitor).
Review of research proposals allows management to gauge engineering group
perception and understanding of company goals.
3. At what point do results of corporate activity become unsolicited
proposals? How is the approach of the unsolicited proposal deter-
mined?
Unsolicited proposals arise from effort conducted under company spon-
sored and government sponsored programs. They are considered particularly
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appropriate when hardware development is foreseen. The approach to un-
solicited proposals is determined by understanding the customers' future
plans and submitting possible solutions to problem areas.
Unsolicited proposals take on more importance because of decreasing
"hunting license" study contracts.
4. How does your company organize its funded study efforts; what con-
sideration is given to time, cost, performance tradeoffs?
A study program manager is assigned and staff support is provided
from the various technology groups. The normal arrangement is a line-type
organization within the engineering department. Technical (including re-
liability) considerations are paramount to time and cost in the study
phases.
5. How does your company decide the level of effort to apply to efforts
6. (government funded or not) which show promise of future contracts?
Do you attempt to generate a value system for a particular effort?
The factors considered in determining the level of effort are: poten-
tial contract award value, company past experience in the particular area
under study, probable competition, relationship to current and long-range
plans, inherent risk to company and customer, potential for commercial
spin-offs. No specific value system is constructed; rather the collective
judgements of marketing, engineering, and manufacturing personnel are
applied.
7. How does your company assess its own capabilities and capacity for
•
undertaking a job?
The assessment of capability is made principally by review of the
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requirements by marketing, engineering, and manufacturing departments.
The criteria of capability is primarily past experience in the particular
technical area; a review is made on each requirement as to the amount of
study, research, design or production that has been previously carried
out at the company. In addition, the following are considered: manpower
availability, personnel training and knowledge exchange possibilities,
facilities availability, special assembly techniques required (which may
improve the company's competitive pc ition on other projects), and any
unusual risks foreseen.
